Is entrepreneurship down, and why?

Scott Shane of Case Western argues that entrepreneurial activity is declining, due to competition from larger rivals with superior scale.

Meanwhile, Jonathan Adler (also of Case Western) has a contrary argument:

It seems to me that another likely contributor is the increased regulatory burden. It is well documented that regulation can increase industry concentration. Smaller firms typically bear significantly greater regulatory costs per employee than larger firms (see, e.g., this study), and regulatory costs can also increase start-up costs and serve as a barrier to entry.

What I find interesting is that entrepreneurial opportunities and activities are not equally distributed across the country: more firm formation happens per capita in Silicon Valley than in (say) Northeastern cities. And California is larger than any other state, the total numbers will be even higher than the ratios.

Today, California is going through a series of changes that are making the business climate less attractive, especially for startups:

• a shortage of venture capital
• increasing taxes
• cutbacks in education and other infrastructure spending
• a political climate that is encouraging increased regulation

California entrepreneurs may continue despite such burdens, or they may move somewhere else, or they may not start a company after all. But a decline in entrepreneurship in California would certainly reduce the total number of US startups more than in a smaller or less entrepreneurial state.

Panel on bootstrapping tech companies

Not surprisingly given the membership pool, the MIT Club of Northern California has four activities related to technical entrepreneurship. This includes separate speaker series on semiconductors and clean technology, as well the Venture Mentoring Series for alumni (more at a later date).

One that I didn’t know about is the C3 group (Convergence, Community and Commerce), which put on a panel last month called “The Art and Science of Bootstrapping.” The four bootstrapping panelists were

• Paul Kocher, Founder, President and Chief Scientist of Cryptography Research
• Michelle Munson, CEO and Co-founder of Aspera Software
• Beatrice Tarka, CEO and Co-founder of Mobissimo
• Sridhar Vembu, CEO and Founder of AdventNet

Although I didn’t make it, there is a long report in the Spring 2009 edition of the MITCNC newsletter.

Not surprisingly, the interest in bootstrapping is motivated by the increasing risk aversion of VCs, making it difficult to get seed funding. Entrepreneurs are having to bootstrap off of personal (or 3F) money to grow the business to a point where it’s interesting to VCs.

There are two paragraphs that caught my attention:

All panelists agreed that a company cannot always remain bootstrapped and there are circumstances when the founder should be open to accepting outside financing. Paul Kochar further elaborated that if a company is in a market that is poised to takeoff and there are no barriers to entry for other competitors to come in, moving fast is key to capturing market share. In such circumstances when a company can grow very quickly, it is imperative to look for the type of financing that can facilitate such growth, for example, to develop customer support and sales organizations or to invest in user experience. On the other hand, if a company is in a niche market with no competitors, then one can afford to bootstrap and slow the growth to maintain financial control.

I am guessing from the report that all of the entrepreneurs had high growth aspirations — and hence their concern about growing quickly before the window of opportunity closed. Here is the other paragraph:

Regarding how long a company can be bootstrapped, Michelle said that it is easy to bootstrap in the first two years of a company’s life, but beyond that it was less clear because the window of opportunity remains open only for so long. Sridhar said that if one does not have a big idea and no big discontinuity, it is better to be bootstrapped. Only 1% of new businesses are venture financed. Paul pointed out that some arenas, such as clean tech or semiconductors, are not generally good candidates for bootstrapping.

Actually, 1% is much too generous a number. By my own calculation, funding peaked in 1999 (during the dot com bubble) at about 0.15%, but in the early 2000s averaged about 0.037% — one company out of 2,700.

Obviously some of the other 2,699 companies are those (like my own) that are high-tech startups or have a strong technology component. Many of these are bootstrapped forever, but this normally consigns the venture to slow growth niches.

This is how I would have summarized the event if I’d attended:

Bootstrapping is a way of getting launched and proving viability to outsiders. However, if you are pursuing a rapid growth opportunity, then you will soon need sizable outside funding — either VC or corporate VC. If your competitors have it and you don’t, you will be left behind.

The greatest source of tech entrepreneurs

Journalists love anniversaries, particularly ones with big round numbers. Politicians (and others seeking publicity) love them two. They’re what we call a “news peg.”

On Sunday, the San Jose Mercury published a long article by Scott Duke Harris celebrating the 100h anniversary of the founding of Federal Telegraph and Telephone in Menlo Park. The article mentioned two other Stanford-related startups founded in the first half of the 20th century — HP [founded in 1937] and Varian Associates [1948] — as well as the familiar list of IT firms from the 1980s and 1990s.

Harris used this history to make a point about Stanford’s role in promoting high-tech entrepreneurial culture:

Stanford University's 100-year tradition of entrepreneurialism, which has spawned such tech giants as Hewlett-Packard, Cisco Systems and Google, has been recognized as a catalyst to Silicon Valley's emergence as the globe's pre-eminent tech hub.

Alas, to quote Will Rogers, “It isn't what we don't know that gives us trouble, it's what we know that ain't so.”

OK, I’m a little biased here. I’m an MIT grad, active in the local MIT club, and onetime entrepreneur alum. I have been researching MIT-trained entrepreneurs as part of a book tentatively named From MIT to Qualcomm. There are also key Stanford rivalries, with strong personal and family ties to the UC system, and today teaching tech entrepreneurship in the shadow of the world’s second richest university. (Full disclosure: I was accepted by Stanford the only time I applied, as a high school senior).

And by no means do I want to minimize the role that Stanford has played in sparcing alumni (and faculty) entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley, starting with Cypress Semiconductor, Electronic Arts and Sun Microsystems in 1982, and extending through Cisco, Yahoo and Google (among many others). After benign neglect by the business school, Stanford’s engineering school has played an incomparable role in promoting technology entrepreneurship among students at Stanford and elsewhere, with efforts like the Stanford Technology Ventures Program and its free iTunes U podcasts.

However, after talking to Silicon Valley historian (and Palo Alto native) Stephen B. Adams, I believe claims of Stanford’s role in the early 20th century are greatly exaggerated. As Steve wrote me in an email responding to the Merc article:

The early start-ups (pre HP) did not take because the Valley lacked critical mass of high tech talent. Therefore, local firms such as Federal and Farnsworth moved to areas (New York/New Jersey and Philadelphia respectively) that already had clusters going. The 1939 Census of Manufacturing showed the same thing that Fred Terman later said: by then the Valley had fewer than 100 scientists and engineers in industry. Not exactly critical mass!

In fact, there wasn’t much to HP until it wartime orders swelled its ranks to 200 employees, and it laid off more than half of those after the war.

At best, Stanford’s role as an entrepreneurial incubator began when Fred Terman was appointed engineering dean in 1946, or when Stanford decided in 1951 to allocate some of its land to form the pioneering Stanford Industrial Park. Even in the 1970s, Stanford’s role in creating startups was not obvious. Shockley (and then Fairchild and Intel) put the “silicon” in Silicon Valley without direct ties to Stanford.

Adams points out that Stanford was aggressively ahead of Berkeley for a very simple reason: without Berkeley’s ongoing support from Sacramento, Stanford badly needed the money. Necessity is the mother of invention.

Which brings me to the other point. As Anna-Lee Saxenian documented in her 1994 book, Regional Advantage, Silicon Valley surpassed Route 128 in the 1980s and never looked back. Saxenian says it’s because of the valley’s open culture, but others argue that it’s because Boston bet on minicomputers while the Bay Area bet on PCs.

However, in the period 1920-1970, there was no question which university was inspiring and fueling technological entrepreneurship: it was MIT.

Losing its land grant status and rejecting a proposed merger with Harvard, in the early 1920s MIT was scrambling to raise resources both for the Institute and for its faculty. (Remember, big Federal R&D spending started with WW II).

During the interwar era, MIT invented its industrial cooperative program (allowing students like Andy Viterbi to work in real jobs to pay for their schooling). It also invented the now-standard consulting rubric used by all American research universities, the “one day a week rule.” This is well recounted by Henry Etzkowitz and his fascinating book, MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science.

Through the end of the 1960s, MIT was also the world’s leading university in creating the field of electrical engineering and establishing computer science as an academic discipline. MIT has its own list of alumni- and faculty- (co)founded companies, with an impressive run of electronics-related startups from 1922-1985 in both Massachusetts and California that included Raytheon (co-founded in 1922 by Vannevar Bush), EG&G, BBN, TI, DEC, Bose, Lotus, PictureTel, 3Com, and Qualcomm. Among those launching its many Bay Area startups were the two men who put the Silicon in Silicon Valley: William Shockley and Robert Noyce.

By the way, where did Terman (son of a Stanford psychologist) learn his trade as a radio engineer? As one biographical article recounts:

Stanford’s own Electrical Engineering Department chairman told Terman that the biggest and best EE department in the country was at MIT. So in 1922 Terman joined a generation of promising EE graduate students on a pilgrimage to Cambridge.

At MIT, Fred undertook graduate study under Vannevar Bush. Fred earned his Doctorate Degree in electrical engineering in 1924, and having a fascination with all of the exciting events at MIT, Fred was to accept a teaching position there.

Due to health reasons, Terman returned to Stanford, but he spent 1941-1945 running the Harvard Radio Research Laboratory, an auxiliary to the much larger MIT Rad Lab.

Today, both MIT and Stanford have exceptionally qualified faculty, undergraduate and graduate students in engineering and the sciences. MIT’s technical role remains strong, but certainly (as the Merc argues) Stanford has taken the lead in fostering tech startups. Stanford has a much better local environment for entrepreneurs, but it’s an open question whether that’s due to West Coast vs. East Coast cultural differences, the availability of VCs, or the wealth of successful entrepreneurs (and entrepreneurial wealth).

If MIT has been eclipsed by Stanford in firm creation, there’s no guarantee that the latter will remain pre-eminent indefinitely. Stanford’s main rival will not be Cal (or even MIT), but instead Tsinghua or the various campuses of IIT.

I don’t think it will happen right away: these other schools may be able to imitate Stanford’s talent, but it will be longer before than can replicate the ecosystem that lies in its back yard. So even if the Merc has the history garbled, the contemporary story of Stanford’s entrepreneurial success is true (at least for the time being).

End of the IPO anomaly?

In 2008, there were only six IPOs nationwide, compared to 365 twenty years earlier. The end of IPOs means that founders no longer run their companies, but instead get acquired by big firms and then quit to do something else.

Sunday’s Merc, presented its annual compilation of the Silicon Valley 150. One noticeable result was a reduction in the number of public companies and also of IPOs.

Columnist Chris O’Brien remarked on the trend:

From 2001 to 2008, there have been 90 IPOs in the valley, an average of 11 annually — and the last one was more than a year ago. Compare that with 331 IPOs in the years from 1990 to 1998, an average of 41 annually. The two years in between were so insane — producing 163 IPOs — that it's no use considering them for sake of comparisons.

We’ve long known that Silicon Valley has a higher rate of IPOs than in other countries, but the evidence also suggests it has a higher rate than the rest of the US.

In my own research on communications startups in San Diego, I’ve noticed a much lower rate of IPOs. By my most recent tally, there are eight public companies in the telecom cluster (a few were either acquired or died after their IPO).

So, I’m sorry to say, the data is starting to confirm my conjecture. The 1980s and 1990s offered an unusual window of opportunity for IPOs — both in terms of the availability of financing and the ability to create a new stand-alone company.

Acquisitions do have a few advantages: they are quicker, available to a wider range of firms, and less dependent on the cyclical capital markets. My mentor Charlie Jackson planned for an IPO but sold his company to Aldus in 1990 when the IPO market closed.

I wonder when (or if) the business (or engineering) school courses in entrepreneurship will notice the change, and adjust their curriculum accordingly.

Illegitimate startups

In grading business plans this week, I was struck by a common blind spot: my undergraduates were overly optimistic about their chances of gaining sales (or distribution) from day one.

They didn’t realize that they would be handicapped by the inherent lack of legitimacy that a brand-new firm has. This is something I lived as a software entrepreneur, but also a well-known problem to strategy researchers.

Just as innovation and entrepreneurship scholars often trace back their core theory to Schumpeter’s “gales of creative destruction,” those worried about the disadvantages faced by young firms go back to sociologist Arthur Stinchcombe and his 1965 book chapter which coined the phrase “liability of newness”.

Subsequent research (such a 1986 ASQ article by Singh et al) has shown that the liability stems in large part to the lack of external legitimacy held by the new organizations. (The test was with nonprofits, but the principle is the same).

I had trouble finding something suitable for undergraduates to read; perhaps this is a publishing opportunity. However, I but did find a closely related 2008 article in Entrepreneur entitled “Credibility is King.”

In class, I tried to tease out the difference between legitimacy and credibility, but given the impromptu nature of the discussion I have to admit I was mostly winging it. In my mind, legitimacy is whether or not you’re in the consideration set. Credibility (as in the political context) is whether or not customers believe what you say.

We brainstormed the reasons or conditions for a lack of legitimacy, and I noticed that they all boiled down to two issues. One is the lack of information (e.g. about the unmeasurable quality of your good). The other is for cases of high risk: making a bad decision on a bicycle helmet is different than doing so for buying an ice cream cone. Again, this is something I hope to elaborate in a future article.

In terms of solutions, most of our options boiled down to two. One is to borrow legitimacy, such as from suppliers (“Intel inside”), dealers, or testimonials by buyers or celebrities. The other is to reduce the risk faced by buyers, such as by providing a free trial.

Again, this is something I’d like to write up sometime, but at least I have a starting point to sensitize future students to this challenge they will face as entrepreneurs.

Are you a bootstrapper?

At SJSU, I’ve been working with some faculty colleagues to try to better explain how and why firms bootstrap. (Of course, there is a big question about what “bootstrap” means).

Last night, our Silicon Valley Center for Entrepreneurship had a panel discussion entitled “Bootstrapping Startups: The Pros and Cons.” It was moderated by angel investor, blogger and SJSU entrepreneurial finance professor Steve Bennet. His panel consisted of:

• Jon Fisher, serial entrepreneur, blogger and author of StrategicEntrepreneurism
• Gustavo Alberelli, director of Kennet Venture Partners that specializes in investing in bootstrap companies
• Ilya Ronin, a former software engineer and SJSU alumnus who is one of the three executives of bootstrapping Marpo Kinetics (an exercise machine company)

Steve opened by saying “Bootstrapping is a topic near and near to my heart.” As he noted, current difficulties of raising investment capital have raised the interest in bootstrapping.

Jon had an interesting definition of bootstrapping:

Can I approve with my management team a merger? … Do the team and I own 50.1% of the company. … Do we have the ability to exit when and if we should?

Jon noted — as I have argued for a while — that the IPO exit was extraordinary, and the normal exit for most firms is (and will be) acquisition. Thus, he argued, it is important for entrepreneurs to design their companies to be acquire-able.

Gus Alberelli’s Kennet Partners, surprisingly, specializes in investing in companies that have already bootstrapped to significant financial results. As their home page proclaims:

You’ve funded your growth the hard way: by selling real value to real customers.

You don’t need venture capital to validate your idea: the market has already done that. You need a different kind of capital.
…
The companies we invest in often do not need money to survive. They have options.

But the right investment from the right partner can help them keep ahead of their markets, expand internationally, ramp up their sales forces and lead to greater value for shareholders.

This is a very thoughtful argument for the bootstrap strategy (and their ability to profit from them). They have detailed pages on why this helps entrepreneurs, and how they choose firms. They have an entire page about bootstrapping, and a white paper entitled “Bootstrap Your Business for Success.”

During Q&A, Gus said they looked for two key things: “Do you have a repeatable sales model and is there a big enough market?” Unlike other VCs, they claim to be agnostic as to whether they will keep the founding CEO (and grow his/her skills) or bring someone else in.

I didn’t take as careful set of notes for Ilya (my former student), because he had a one hour presentation to my day class that had many more details. At that session, he listed some of the key bootstrapping challenges:

• Lots of work
• Difficulties in attracting a good team
• Small volumes mean less buying power and higher COGS
• Slower growth
• High level of stress on personal life

Starting with limited funds, the bootstrapper’s way out is to acquire customers quickly that pay the bills. Ilya number one piece of advice:

• Look for customers that are most likely to buy quickly
• Don’t target big segments that will take longer and are less likely to pay off

I am hoping that the panel will end up on the web or iTunes U. If so, I’ll add a link.

Finally, I want to end where Steve started: with a humorous quiz on bootstrapping, crafted by Greg Gianforte, founder of RightNow Technologies. (Angel Tim Keane has the full quiz online). The theme of the quiz is a self-assessment of the reader’s bootstrapping abilities (or proclivities).

My favorite question:

5. Your product does not do everything a prospect wants. You should?
a. Tell them it won't do those things;
b. Get them to pay for the enhancements;
c. Take the order and tell them it will ship in four weeks;
d. Explain why those things are difficult to do and convince them to buy the current product.

This was funny because it was so real: it exactly fits my experience as the head of a software company that bootstrapped from a $12,500 staring investment to a seven-figure run rate.

Update 1:45pm: Steve Bennet has summarized his own views of the event.

VCs vs. entrepreneurs

To be successful, any sort of business deal must align conflicting interests. In thinking about venture capital, the decision of entrepreneurs to seek (and accept) VC investments assumes that both parties want the company to succeed, and the only conflict is over the terms of the investment (particularly the dilution).

However, a couple of recent blog posts highlight a second, equally important category of conflicting interests: control over the timing of exit.

On AngelBlog, Basil Peters recounts an example of a tech startup with a chance to exit via acquisition, one that would produce a 3x return for VCs, and perhaps 10x for the angels and 100x for entrepreneurs. The problem is that the VC needs a bigger return (the home run) from its winners to cover its losers. This is consistent with the story of VC investment math told by Bob Zider a decade ago in his HBR article, “How Venture Capital Works.”

Of course, such an early offer may mark a peak in the company’s valuation — in an increasingly competitive segment (as in the Peters example), the total return will only go down. Once faced with an obviously worsening situation — whether firm-specific problems or an increasingly unprofitable industry — VC are known to pull the plug prematurely, saving management attention for the likely winners rather than spending more time salvaging a “dog.” In my SD Telecom study, we had to interview one founder in the final few days before the VCs closed the door forever.

The other point is that, come hell or high water, the VCs will liquidate their investment before their investment fund matures and must return capital (and earnings) to its principals. As VCs freely admit, this means they seek a quick exit — ideally 3-5 years, with 7 years at the outside. Blogger Sigurd Rinde of Germany notes the disconnect between achieving VC objectives, and the goal of many tech entrepreneurs of creating long-term value.

I had a slow growth, bootstrap startup, which never sought (nor was suitable) for VC. This had its pluses and minuses, but it’s clear (as I used to say back then) that taking VC is like starting a time bomb: you have to come up with an answer before it goes off, or you’re dead.