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Showing posts with label policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label policy. Show all posts

Friday, July 26, 2019

When tech entrepreneurs attack science

(Cross posted from the Bio Business blog)

One of the most remarkable trends in science-based entrepreneurship is the recent explosion of fake meat companies.

I saw my first fake meat company in 2015 at the graduation event for the first class of startups at the IndieBio accelerator in San Francisco, doing egg whites. Now leading companies like Impossible Foods and Beyond Meat have landed their fake hamburger in fast food chains.

At breakfast yesterday with my boss’s boss, he remarked that some of the burgers are actually quite good, and we agreed that (someday) it has the potential to be a trillion dollar business. This seems to be one of the rare examples where the outrageous predictions by tech entrepreneurs of creating a huge new market might actually be true.

Adoption Paths

The initial pioneers may grab decent exit values, and the long-term future of replacing meat seems compelling. California alone spends 6 trillion liters of water a year on alfalfa alone (feed for cattle and horses), not counting other states, and the water for pig slop and chicken feed. Meanwhile, cow farts play a non-neglgible role in increasing greenhouse gasses. And there is also a sizable niche of the populace that either refused to eat meat, or even wants to deny others the right to do so.

It’s not clear when it will become a trillion dollar market: as I showed in my 2014 paper in the Journal of Technology Transfer, California firms created the solar industry but flamed out because they got into the market 20-30 years too early. Competing with commodity electrons is a tough adoption curve: very few people voluntarily choose to pay 50% or 100% more than market prices for a commodity, although Germany and California show that politicians can force their voters to do so and (mostly) get away with it.

What I didn’t realize until I thought it through is that meat has an easier adoption curve, with a wide range of niche markets that can be sustained at premium prices. You have affluent people who don’t eat meat — or, even better, recently gave up meat — as well as environmentally conscious customers who would like to avoid meat. You have people who are willing to give it a try, out of curiosity. And — as the burger joints have demonstrated — the B2B customer (distribution) is willing to try a niche product to raise average selling prices.

Thus, as the product gets better and the prices get lower, these firms can establish and grow their beachhead in the food market, carving off ever-larger segments of the market. Funded by Sand Hill Road and led by ambitious entrepreneurs, some will hold off for Facebook-style IPOs, but many of the weaker players will be bought up by ADM, ConAgra, Hormel and the like — providing bottomless capital to spur innovation and adoption. (The entry barriers are low enough that Tyson Foods is launching its own product directly, rather than by acquisition).

We Need Science

However, to fully displace meat, there are major technical challenges to be overcome, both in quality and cost. I supervised a student project to research synthetic organs — a more demanding applications — but still getting the texture right will require both science (new insights) and engineering (new applications) to create a quality product at a competitive price.

Thus, I was struck by the decision of one fake meat company to attack GMOs to win market share. Yes, the CEO is a 24-year-old recent Berkeley grad who’s never worked in a company. Yes, her bachelor’s degrees are in toxicology and environmental studies rather than molecular biology or chemical engineering. But the company does have one PhD (food science) in its leadership, so they presumably are doing actual science.

It reminds me (and not in a good way) of the various surveys that showed the gap between what the public thinks and what scientists (writ large) think about GMOs, including a 2015 survey that said 37% of the public thought GMOs are safe vs. 88% of scientists.

More troubling is that the certainty of these opinions seems inversely proportional to actual knowledge. As the NY Times wrote on Monday:
In a paper published early this year in Nature Human Behavior, scientists asked 500 Americans what they thought about foods that contained genetically modified organisms.
The vast majority, more than 90 percent, opposed their use. This belief is in conflict with the consensus of scientists. Almost 90 percent of them believe G.M.O.s are safe — and can be of great benefit.
The second finding of the study was more eye-opening. Those who were most opposed to genetically modified foods believed they were the most knowledgeable about this issue, yet scored the lowest on actual tests of scientific knowledge.
In other words, those with the least understanding of science had the most science-opposed views, but thought they knew the most. Lest anyone think this is only an American phenomenon, the study was also conducted in France and Germany, with similar results.
So I get that trust in authority has been declining since the 1970s. I get that we have many people who don’t understand — or have the time to personally verify — scientific research. And, as Orwell predicted (and Goebbels proved), people are easily persuaded to believe lies if they are repeated often enough in the mass media.

Still, why would companies that depend on scientists to create their products help promote such lies? Isn’t the benefit of saving the planet enough, without having to rely on junk science for the purpose of virtue signaling? And if companies that depend on science attack science, what are the implications for K-12 and university science indication, science policy and the idea of using facts — rather than emotion - as the basis for making science policy?

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

The incentives for entrepreneurial risk

Cross-posted from the Bio Business blog

I have been teaching innovation management for more than 15 years at three different schools. In most cases, I kick off the course with a discussion of the incentives for innovation, a topic of particular interest to Berkeley economists such as David Teece and the late Suzanne Scotchmer.

Innovation and IncentivesThe fundamental idea is that innovation is risky in many ways: the innovator doesn't know if the technology will work (technological uncertainty), whether the market will value it (market uncertainty) or whether the innovator will be able to hold off imitators and other competitors long enough to make a profit (appropriability and ompetitive uncertainty).

As with any other gamble — whether investing early-stage companies or lottery tickets — the innovation winners have to pay above-normal returns to cover the partial or total losses from the losers. Business is an experiment, and if you don’t compensate for the risk, then entrepreneurs, managers and investors will avoid risk. (We can debate the magnitude or the approach to providing incentives — as Scotchmer and others have done—without denying the inexorable need for such incentives).

Of course, outsiders only see the winners of the lottery or the IPO jackpots. They don’t see the dry wells, the failed companies or the other investments that fail to pan out. So the big success of blockbuster drugs attracts attention (and populist attacks) from those who don’t factor in the cost of failures. In many cases, this is due to economic ignorance — innovation costs or economics more generally — and in some cases this ignorance is willful.

Forbes columnist (and former Pfizer R&D head) John LaMattina attacks such ignorance in his February 3 column “New York Times Op-Eds Misleading Regarding The Biopharmaceutical Industry.” The column is balanced and thoughtful, allowing for the basis of most of the criticisms while decrying the economic ignorance (willful or otherwise) beyond the criticism.

In the category of willful ignorance has to be that of economics Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, a “frequent” critic of the pharma industry (and, IMHO, capitalism more broadly). Let me briefly except LaMattina’s comments on the Stiglitz op-ed:
1) “In generics friendly India, for example, Gilead Sciences, which makes an effective hepatitis C drug, recently announced that it would sell the drug for a little more than 1% of the $84,000 it charges here.” – Actually, “generics friendly India” really means that India has its own rules when it comes to intellectual property (IP) and often refuses to recognize legitimate IP positions.
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2) “Overly restrictive intellectual property rights actually slow new discoveries by making it more difficult for scientists to build on the research of others and by choking off the exchange of ideas that is critical to innovation.” – This is a stunning misrepresentation of the R&D process in the biopharmaceutical industry. For any investment to be made in R&D, be it the 3 person start-up company or a Big Pharma, the promise of a financial return must exist. An absolute requirement for these investments is having sufficient IP to justify that a project, if successful, will provide such a financial return.
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3) “As it is, most of the important innovations come out of our universities and research centers, like the NIH, funded by governments and foundations”. – As I have said in the past, these contributions are very important in the search for new medicines. But Stiglitz, like many other critics, is either ignorant of the amount of R&D carried out by the biopharmaceutical industry or chooses to minimize that the industry’s applied research is what converts nascent ideas and discoveries to the breakthrough medicines that are continually generated by the industry.
I would be naturally sympathetic to LaMattina’s criticisms due to my free market bias, which stems both from my first experience as an entrepreneur, what I’ve learned studying technological innovation for the past 20 years, and of course what I’ve also learned teaching students how to run innovation-related businesses.

However, his three criticisms have particular salience now that I’ve co-founded a new (pharmaceutical) startup that is a spinoff of my current employer. It is (as he says) a 3-person startup, bootstrap funded for now, trying to bring a breakthrough therapy to market.

My two co-founders and I are working nights and weekends — alongside our regular jobs — to raise funds, validate the science, and try to get something approved by the FDA. We wouldn’t be working so hard (#2) unless there was some possibility of a big return at the end: hypothetically, if we’re each putting $10,000 worth of effort into it each year, then if we have a 10% chance of success then we’d each want a $100k+/p.a. return (actually more given due known entrepreneurial optimism biases).

Of course, we wouldn’t have started down this path without IP. We have to talk to the government, CROs, CMOs, potential investors, industry execs and others to make our idea feasible. We are a tiny company with no full-time employees and minuscule resources: almost anyone we talk to is better equipped to bring this to market than we do. All we have is an idea, a vision and the (patent pending) IP that we hope will allow us an exclusive to bring this to market (if we can overcome all the uncertainties).

Finally, we have thought long and hard about commercialization. Even if every NIH or other government grant goes our way, we’ll have certain regulatory, manufacturing, distribution and (yes) IP costs that won’t be covered by government grants. These costs are far beyond what we can bear personally, so unless the potential returns are attractive enough, we won’t get the equity investment necessary to bring this therapy to market.

The Stiglitz ignorance (or misrepresentation) is depressing but utterly commonplace, particularly among economic populists. But sometimes these populists can see the light.

In the 1970s, there was no more outspoken populist among national political figures than George McGovern (1922-2012), the South Dakota senator and 1972 Democratic presidential nominee. After retiring from the senate, he opened a hotel in Connecticut and found out firsthand how little politicians know about business risks.

As McGovern wrote in a June 1, 1992 Wall Street Journal op-ed (quoted in a 2011 Forbes article):
In retrospect, I wish I had known more about the hazards and difficulties of such a business, especially during a recession of the kind that hit New England just as I was acquiring the inn’s 43-year leasehold. I also wish that during the years I was in public office, I had had this firsthand experience about the difficulties business people face every day. That knowledge would have made me a better U.S. senator and a more understanding presidential contender.
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We intuitively know that to create job opportunities we need entrepreneurs who will risk their capital against an expected payoff. Too often, however, public policy does not consider whether we are choking off those opportunities.
So there is hope for intelligent people who get out of the Ivory Tower (or the Beltway) to try to make a living in the real world. McGovern was a man of modest means — a modern-day Harry Truman — trying to put away money for retirement. Millionaire politicians and academics are unlikely to leave their comfort zones, but there’s still a chance for skeptics to experience this epiphany.

Sunday, June 29, 2014

Drag on startups is drag on the economy

We know that entrepreneurs are essential to economic growth in the U.S., but two economists (one of them Nobel) brought this point home last week:
Behind the Productivity Plunge: Fewer Startups
By Edward C. Prescott and Lee H. Ohanian

In the first quarter of 2014 … [productivity] declined at a 3.5% annual rate. This is the worst productivity statistic since 1990. And productivity since 2005 has declined by more than 8% relative to its long-run trend. This means that business output is nearly $1 trillion less today than what it would be had productivity continued to grow at its average rate of about 2.5% per year.

…In our view, an important factor contributing to declining productivity growth is the large decline in the creation of new businesses. The creation rate of new businesses, as well as new plants built by existing firms, was about 30% lower in 2011 … compared with the annual average rate for the 1980s.
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If history is any indication, many of today's economic heavyweights will ultimately decline as new businesses take their place. Research by the Kaufman Foundation shows that only about half of the 1995 Fortune 500 firms remained on the list in 2010.

Startups also have declined in high technology. John Haltiwanger of the University of Maryland reports that there are fewer startups in high technology and information-processing since 2000, as well as fewer high-growth startups—annual employment growth of more than 25%—across all sectors. Even more troubling is that the smaller number of high-growth startups is not growing as quickly as in the past.
The authors (economists from Arizona State and UCLA respectively) attribute this to the regulatory drag on small business, both in terms of raising the cost of doing business and specifically the complexity of tax compliance.

However, another explanation (which I blogged last year) was the risk aversion of would-be entrepreneurs. Is that due to regulation? Due to a belief that the system is rigged? To the challenges of starting a company in an economy that never fully recovered from the Great Recession? Or — more simply — a loss of optimism by entrepreneurs that they can financially recover if their venture is unsuccessful.

I don’t have an answer, but this is just further evidence that making the US economy more startup-friendly is essential the country’s economic and political future.