If Facebook kills entrepreneurship, what’s next?

The $19b that Facebook paid to buy WhatsApp is shaking up Silicon Valley, as other Internet startups try to figure out how they can get their own inflated multiple.

But for the rest of the world of tech entrepreneurship — such as life sciences — it could further starve the flow of investment capital they need to get off the ground.

Entrepreneurship guru Steve Blank tweeted Monday

steve blank ‏@sgblank Feb 24
Why Facebook is killing Silicon Valley http://steveblank.com/2012/05/21/why-facebook-is-killing-silicon-valley/ … more relevant today

The earlier article talked about his work teaching entrepreneurship for science-based startups:

The irony is that as good as some of these nascent startups are in material science, sensors, robotics, medical devices, life sciences, etc., more and more frequently VCs whose firms would have looked at these deals or invested in these sectors, are now only interested in whether it runs on a smart phone or tablet. And who can blame them.

Facebook and Social Media
Facebook has adroitly capitalized on market forces on a scale never seen in the history of commerce. For the first time, startups can today think about a Total Available Market in the billions of users (smart phones, tablets, PC’s, etc.) and aim for hundreds of millions of customers. Second, social needs previously done face-to-face, (friends, entertainment, communication, dating, gambling, etc.) are now moving to a computing device. And those customers may be using their devices/apps continuously. This intersection of a customer base of billions of people with applications that are used/needed 24/7 never existed before.

The potential revenue and profits from these users (or advertisers who want to reach them) and the speed of scale of the winning companies can be breathtaking. The Facebook IPO has reinforced the new calculus for investors. In the past, if you were a great VC, you could make $100 million on an investment in 5-7 years. Today, social media startups can return 100’s of millions or even billions in less than 3 years. …

If investors have a choice of investing in a blockbuster cancer drug that will pay them nothing for fifteen years or a social media application that can go big in a few years, which do you think they’re going to pick? If you’re a VC firm, you’re phasing out your life science division. As investors funding clean tech watch the Chinese dump cheap solar cells in the U.S. and put U.S. startups out of business, do you think they’re going to continue to fund solar? And as Clean Tech VC’s have painfully learned, trying to scale Clean Tech past demonstration plants to industrial scale takes capital and time past the resources of venture capital. A new car company? It takes at least a decade and needs at least a billion dollars. Compared to IOS/Android apps, all that other stuff is hard and the returns take forever.

Two years ago — ironically a few weeks before Blank’s blog posting — I started writing my own posting along these same lines. What I wrote (but never posted):

Did software ruin entrepreneurship?
On Friday, I sat between two entrepreneurs at an office party for my old job. One of the entrepreneurs is in clean tech (hardware) while the other is in IT (software). One is in his 30s and one is in his 50s.

The hardware guy was talking about his challenges raising funds. One VC told him (I'm paraphrasing): “I gave Instagram $5 million and got back $200 million. Why should I give you money?” [after their $1 billion acquisition by Facebook].

The remainder of my (incipient) argument was that software promises abnormally low cap short returns, and the amount of money needed to fund a software company is getting smaller by the week, as VC Mark Suster wrote back in 2011.

How will this play out? I see at least four possibilities:

1. During the dot-bomb (dot-con) era we had too much money chasing too few good ideas, and what resulted was what economists call excess entry. Eventually the bubble burst — and it could again.
2. Another possibility is that these other ideas don’t get funded. There are business models that made sense in the 1890s or 1950s that no longer make sense — such as ones that are labor intensive or based on craft work — and new businesses here don’t get launched.
3. Blank points to the genius philosopher-king model — where a really rich guy (it’s almost always a guy) puts his money where is mouth is (again, almost always a big mouth). In a previous century it was Howard Hughes or Richard Branson, while today Blank points to Elon Musk.
4. The final possibility is that politicians play kingmaker, not with their own money but with Other People’s Money, i.e. yours and mine. (They will be egged on by a incantations of “market failure” of a few economists.) While this may make sense for public goods such as public health, we saw how such large scale private intervention worked with firms like Solyndra.

Of course, these are not mutually exclusive. Musk depends on public subsidies to support the business models of Tesla and SolarCity, although — unlike Fisker and Solyndra — he’s at least offering something people want to buy. SpaceX depends on public procurement, but I believe his announced plans that this is just a bootstrap to get the business off the group (so to speak).

Is there a happy ending? Like Blank, I think the Facebook effect is going to get worse before it gets better.

Some tech startups are more high-tech than others

In the business press, academic teaching and research, there’s often a discussion of the unique characteristics of “tech startups”, “technology entrepreneurship” and “technology-based firms.” Such startups are the focus of this blog.

Often the distinction between high- and low-tech startups is measured by the proportion of technical employees — such as fraction of R&D employees or fraction of R&D spending (i.e. R&D intensity).

Still, tech startups are not homogeneous. Some of the distinctions that have been draw are science- vs. engineering-based startups, or industry-specific startups like IT, cleantech, or biotech.

This week I attended two business plan competitions here in Claremont: Wednesday’s business plan competition at the Keck Graduate Institute (which I organized) and today’s Kravis Competition across all the Claremont Colleges.

Judges at KGI 2013 Business Plan Competition: George Golumbeski, Stephen Eck, Bob Curry. Not shown: Liam Ratcliffe, Paul Grand

Our KGI business plans (from my ALS 458 class) were all about commercializing patented (or patent-pending) biomedical technologies (therapies, diagnostics, devices) developed by top research institutions such as Caltech, City of Hope, and USC. The Kravis competition included several IT concepts, some low tech businesses, and AccuMab, a cancer diagnostic company from my KGI class.

In comparing the KGI plans to the other Claremont projects — or those in our textbook — it seems to me that — at least from a financial standpoint — there are three types of companies: high tech, medium tech and no tech.

What is dramatically different about our students projects was that (with one exception) is that they’re highly capital intensive, requiring $5 to $50 million in outside funding. For example, the winning team — using technology from Children’s Hospital Los Angeles to repair Shortened Bowel Syndrome — estimated it needs $20 million in equity and $5 million in government grants to get to market. This project — like many others — is building on millions of dollars of NIH/NSF/foundation grants already received to develop the basic science. There is a certain minimum scale required to get FDA approval and thus generate first revenues.

2013 winning KGI team — Hadi Mirmalek-Sani, Porus Shah, Shrina Shah, Rajesh Pareta —
with Bob Curry, chair, KGI Board of Trustees

Think about the story of Mark Zuckerberg, who launched The Facebook in early 2004 and took its first outside investment (of $500k) later that year. (Yes, they didn’t monetize initially, but still they created a compelling product and reached a million subscribers using the founders’ money). The iPhone app startups were launched for tens of thousands of dollars: Rovio had 40 million Angry Birds users before they took their 2011 Series A investment.

Over the years, entrepreneurship researchers (and practitioners) have demonstrated that any new company or product has highest uncertainty and risk up until first customer sale. So from a practical standpoint, I suggest a new metric: how much R&D spending do you need before launching a product? How big a bet — with what scale of outside investment — does it take until the entrepreneur finds out whether (s)he has a viable business?

By this measure, the difference is not the % of the money that goes to R&D but the size of the R&D bet that’s needed to test the marketing hypothesis.

A company that takes 5+ years and $50+ million is fundamentally different from one that can ship a 1.0 (or revenue-generating beta) for less than $1 million. By that standard, after biotech the biggest bets required are for renewable energy. You can start dozens (or hundreds) of software companies for one fully mature biotech, biofuels or solar company.

VC is no panacea for startup success

One of the major messages taught in entrepreneurship classes is the importance of winning venture capital. Now research by a retired entrepreneur suggests it’s no panacea, according to a report last week in the Wall Street Journal:

About three-quarters of venture-backed firms in the U.S. don't return investors' capital, according to recent research by Shikhar Ghosh, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School.

Compare that with the figures that venture capitalists toss around. The common rule of thumb is that of 10 start-ups, only three or four fail completely. Another three or four return the original investment, and one or two produce substantial returns.

The latter matches the famous Bob Zider article in HBR that we entrepreneurship faculty have all used at one point or another.

Based on Ghosh’s study of 2000+ firms that received VC from 2004-2010, approximately 30-40% end in liquidation with investors losing all their money. As Berkeley entrepreneurship scholar Toby Stuart notes, failure is even harder on those who bootstrapped their company using their own or family money (rather than drawing a salary at a VC-funded startup).

Of course, the risk/reward profiles are different between the venture and non-venture backed startups:

"People are embarrassed to talk about their failures, but the truth is that if you don't have a lot of failures, then you're just not doing it right, because that means that you're not investing in risky ventures," [said David Cowan of Bessemer Venture Partners]. "I believe failure is an option for entrepreneurs and if you don't believe that, then you can bang your head against the wall trying to make it work."

Overall, nonventure-backed companies fail more often than venture-backed companies in the first four years of existence, typically because they don't have the capital to keep going if the business model doesn't work, Harvard's Mr. Ghosh says. Venture-backed companies tend to fail following their fourth years--after investors stop injecting more capital, he says.

Of all companies, about 60% of start-ups survive to age three and roughly 35% survive to age 10, according to separate studies by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.

As the article alludes, there is a larger question of why the firm failed, which could include:

• VCs pulled the plug
• ran out of money
• entrepreneurs decided to fold their hand

These are often correlated, but it’s hard in a large-scale study to determine the direction of causality between them. In many cases, the best strategy is the fail fast and live to fight another day (particularly if you haven’t bankrupted yourself in the process).

Ghosh has a Harvard MBA, spent his earlier career as a partner at BCG and before becoming a serial entrepreneur founding a series of IT startups including Appex and Open Market. Alas, there’s no paper on his website to share the ful details of his study.

Sometimes the VCs are right

Regular readers of this blog know that I’m of two minds about VCs. There are some business opportunities (such as the biotech companies KGI alumni work for) that require venture investing. However, VCs often work contrary to the entrepreneurs’ interests — sometimes comically so.

At an algae (and biofuels) conference in San Diego last week, David Tze of the boutique private equity firm Oceanis talked about what he looks for in an investment. Some of it was specific to his fund’s focus (aquaculture, i.e. feeding farmed fish), but some of it was more generic.

In particular, he lifted (with full attribution) Sequoia Capital’s advice for entrepreneurs seeking funding for their business plans. The checklist for business plans matches what any entrepreneur might learn from a business plan class, but the “elements of sustainable companies” was a little more provocative:

Start-ups with these characteristics have the best chance of becoming enduring companies. We like to partner with start-ups that have:

Clarity of Purpose
Summarize the company's business on the back of a business card.

Large Markets
Address existing markets poised for rapid growth or change. A market on the path to a $1B potential allows for error and time for real margins to develop.

Rich Customers
Target customers who will move fast and pay a premium for a unique offering.

Focus
Customers will only buy a simple product with a singular value proposition.

Pain Killers
Pick the one thing that is of burning importance to the customer then delight them with a compelling solution.

Think Differently
Constantly challenge conventional wisdom. Take the contrarian route. Create novel solutions. Outwit the competition.

Team DNA
A company’s DNA is set in the first 90 days. All team members are the smartest or most clever in their domain. "A" level founders attract an "A" level team.

Agility
Stealth and speed will usually help beat-out large companies.

Frugality
Focus spending on what's critical. Spend only on the priorities and maximize profitability.

Inferno
Start with only a little money. It forces discipline and focus. A huge market with customers yearning for a product developed by great engineers requires very little firepower.

Of these, some are motherhood and apple (or Apple®) pie. The “frugality” and “inferno” seem ironic given the role of Sequoia (and other Sand Hill Road) VCs in fueling various bubbles over the years.

However, I think two points bear repeating — and I will repeat both in teaching my entrepreneurship class and advising would-be entrepreneurs. One is the “pain point” idea, now a part of the guidelines give for many opportunity pitch competitions.

Perhaps more interestingly — at least for tech entrepreneurs — is the idea of price-insensitive customers to buy the early expensive products until the firm learns how to make the products faster and cheaper. This is how computers, cellphones, Internet service got started, and my own research into telecom engineers shows the same effect. Since joining a biotech-oriented institute, I’ve also learned how life science companies have targeted expensive pain points, as when Genentech targeted the human insulin with its first product, Humulin.

So overall, I believe the experience of VCs can help nascent entrepreneurs prioritize their efforts — as long as they watch their wallet when it comes time for actual investments.

Cleantech entrepreneurs: life without VC?

Cross-posted to Cleantech Business.

Statistics released Friday by the Cleantech Group say that “cleantech” VC investments in 2010 hit a record $7.8 billion, up 28% from the $6.1 billion in 2009 for North America, Europe and Chindia. The N.A. data was even more impressive, up 45% to $5.28 billion. Worldwide, solar continued to account for the largest share of the investments, up 52% from 2009 to $1.83 billion.

Although this sounds encouraging, Iris Kuo of VentureBeat had a different take. First, cleantech VC investment has been declining for the past two quarters. Instead, the capital-intensive have been going to government sources, including BrightSource, Solyndra and Tesla.

However, analysts are just beginning to realize that cleantech businesses may be fundamentally unsuitable for VC investment. A series of clues have emerged in the past 6 months.

Exhibit A was the whole debate started by VC Fred Wilson and his “two venture capital industries” thesis:

The first VC industry is investing in software based businesses. The software VC business has been fundamentally altered by the massive decrease in the cost of building and launching a software based business.…

The second VC industry is investing in cleantech, biotech and other capital intensive tech businesses that have economic models that have not been fundamentally altered. This VC industry operates largely the same way it has operated for the past twenty or thirty years.

The statistics were supported by TechCrunch data from the first 8 months of 2010: an average of $5m for web/ecommerce vs. $31m for cleantech.

Exhibit B was the decision of Kleiner Perkins to pull back from cleantech investing and go back to its roots in IT. Of all the major Silicon Valley VCs, KPCB had made the most aggressive bet on cleantech — particularly green energy. This is the firm that in 2007 made a partner out of a former presidential candidate and Nobel Prize winner.

Exhibit C are the observations of one of the most respected IT industry executives, analysts, inventor and entrepreneurs: Bob Metcalfe (MIT ’69), inventor of Ethernet and founder of 3Com. Having finished a decade as a venture general partner, last month Metcalfe said that the VC model (so far) does not fit cleantech:

Q: What did you learn from your investing in clean-tech, or as you call it, enertech?

A: I’m still in the process of learning – this is complicated stuff. But I learned that the innovation environment in the energy space is not there yet. The problems we see are a mismatch between the asset class called venture capital and the innovation opportunities in energy – it takes too much capital and it takes too much time. But I claim that’s only because the innovation environment in energy hasn’t developed, say, the way it has in pharma. Drugs take a lot of money and a long time, but there’s a lot of venture capital activity in drug discovery. That’s because the drug-discovery business has grown into being able to exploit the venture capital model. The partnerships that big pharma has with drug companies in stage one, stage two, stage three [clinical trials] allow venture capitalists to do what they do and get the returns that they need. The energy space has not quite developed, but it will.

This entire debate was anticipated by Prof. Martin Kenney of UC Davis, the editor of Understanding Silicon Valley — perhaps the leading academic expert on Silicon Valley and a longtime expert on hightech VC.

In July 2009, Kenney wrote a book chapter entitled “Venture Capital Investment in the Greentech Industries: A Provocative Essay” that will be published in the Handbook of Research on Energy Entrepreneurship. He notes a number of warning signs:

1. investors have been pouring money into green energy without being able to get it back from IPOs;
2. market growth may be slow, since “clean” technologies are competing with established (and cheaper or better) incumbents;
3. the cleantech bubble investing bubble parallels the Internet bubble;
4. thus far, the most successful cleantech businesses have been self-funded: either bootstrapped (e.g. Danish wind turbines) or internal green ventures from existing multinationals like Siemens and Sanyo.

Kenney tries to offer a positive scenario, suggesting that VCs could learn and adapt like they have in biotech. However, in the past 18 months have been signs that biotech VC may be facing similar problems (if the returns to pharma R&D are becoming less certain).

While the scale of investment in energy is enormous, the VCs have various reasons to actually favor larger deals (and often pension funds throwing money at them to invest). While VC worked great during the 1990s with relatively small investments followed by quick exits via IPO or acquisition, but both are much harder in renewable energy.

The first problem is the time scale. If (as Zider’s 1998 classic HBR article suggests) VCs seek a 10x liquidity event after 5 years (to cover their losers), then doubling the delay to 10 years cuts the IRR by more than half (and the NPV even more than that). For a 10 year exit — and ignoring the increased risk of failure — the same IRR would require a 100x return.

The other problem is that the size of the investment reduces (if not eliminates) the opportunity to exit via acquisition. A 10x return via acquisition was common for $50m dot-com investments, but such exits are going to be much rarer with $500m invested; a 100x return is going to be out of the question.

If VC can’t find a way to make money off cleantech investments, then cleantech entrepreneurs are going to have a hard time bringing their businesses to scale. Without VC, new businesses will have a hard time competing with self-funded multinational incumbents — or government-funded enterprises in large centrally-planned economies.

VCs vs. entrepreneurs

To be successful, any sort of business deal must align conflicting interests. In thinking about venture capital, the decision of entrepreneurs to seek (and accept) VC investments assumes that both parties want the company to succeed, and the only conflict is over the terms of the investment (particularly the dilution).

However, a couple of recent blog posts highlight a second, equally important category of conflicting interests: control over the timing of exit.

On AngelBlog, Basil Peters recounts an example of a tech startup with a chance to exit via acquisition, one that would produce a 3x return for VCs, and perhaps 10x for the angels and 100x for entrepreneurs. The problem is that the VC needs a bigger return (the home run) from its winners to cover its losers. This is consistent with the story of VC investment math told by Bob Zider a decade ago in his HBR article, “How Venture Capital Works.”

Of course, such an early offer may mark a peak in the company’s valuation — in an increasingly competitive segment (as in the Peters example), the total return will only go down. Once faced with an obviously worsening situation — whether firm-specific problems or an increasingly unprofitable industry — VC are known to pull the plug prematurely, saving management attention for the likely winners rather than spending more time salvaging a “dog.” In my SD Telecom study, we had to interview one founder in the final few days before the VCs closed the door forever.

The other point is that, come hell or high water, the VCs will liquidate their investment before their investment fund matures and must return capital (and earnings) to its principals. As VCs freely admit, this means they seek a quick exit — ideally 3-5 years, with 7 years at the outside. Blogger Sigurd Rinde of Germany notes the disconnect between achieving VC objectives, and the goal of many tech entrepreneurs of creating long-term value.

I had a slow growth, bootstrap startup, which never sought (nor was suitable) for VC. This had its pluses and minuses, but it’s clear (as I used to say back then) that taking VC is like starting a time bomb: you have to come up with an answer before it goes off, or you’re dead.

Raising capital in difficult times

In the past six months, it’s become even more difficult for otherwise promising tech startups to new or follow-on funding. On October 7, the now-infamous Sequoia PowerPoint deck advised their (mainly high- tech) portfolio companies:

New Realities
$15M Raise @ $100M post[-money valuation] is gone
Series B/C will be smaller raises
Customer uptake will be slower
Cuts are a must
Need to become cash flow positive

While some suggested this was a bargaining tactic by Sequoia to lower valuations, startup companies now face a double-whammy of declining demand by business and consumers and less availability of investment funds.

Of even more concern to the VCs, exit strategies will be more rare, less lucrative and more time consuming:

Increased Challenges
M&A will decrease
Prices will decrease
Acquiring entities will favor profitable companies
IPOs will continue to decrease and will take longer

Since VCs won’t be able to cash in their investments for a long time, they must set aside more money to keep alive a smaller number of companies.

In Thursday’s Wall Street Journal, veteran tech industry reporter Pui-Wing Tam wrote about [also here] the dilemma faced by a small Oakland-based VC fund:

Claremont Creek Ventures recently had to decide which of its young to forsake.
…
Amid the financial crisis and the plunging stock market, Claremont Creek decided to focus on the fund's best investments and stop backing the less-promising start-ups. It wanted to be sure it had enough cash for the next few years for the winners. The venture firm ranked the start-ups in the fund's 16-company portfolio with an A, B or C grade.

"We're doubling down on the As and likely won't invest any more capital in the C companies," says John Steuart, a Claremont Creek managing director. "The portfolio is competing against itself and it's survival of the fittest. It's brutal."

Angel investor and fellow SJSU entrepreneurship teacher Steve Bennet is one of the few who has beat the odds. In his ProfessorVC blog, he explains how one of his portfolio companies raised $6 million in Series C funds.

For those that have already tapped 3F money and can’t raise professional money, the choices are pretty clear: sell the company, stop operations or find a way to bootstrap.

Steve will be moderating a March 9th panel on bootstrapping at the Silicon Valley Center for Entrepreneurship. More details on the program when they are available.

The lighter side of raising money

Raising venture capital is an essential prerequisite to many tech startup business plans. While some companies — usually software or services — can bootstrap off of savings or credit cards, companies with high R&D or manufacturing costs need a sizable cash hoard before they see first revenues (let alone profits).

In teaching about VC, my favorite tool has been the documentary Startup.com. Although about a New York-based startup called GovWorks.com, the presentations and negotiations with Kleiner Perkins, General Atlantic and Highland Capital illustrate the broader issues faced by tech startups raising money.

A friend, serial (i.e. chronic) tech entrepreneur Doug Klein, recommended The VC, a comic strip from the dot-com era. The strip rang true: as an entrepreneur during this period, Doug swears he lived each of these vignettes at some point during their fund-raising efforts.

The comics take the point of view that the actions of VCs are funny. Some of these are painful funny, as in the VC is going to flush us because he can’t buy a clue. Most of them are about laughing at (rather than with) the VCs in some way, shape or form.

All 52 strips from 1997-2000 are online at TheVC.com Business school professors (and public speakers) have been using Dilbert cartoons for a decade to lighten up discussions of project management, managers and (more generally) corporate bureaucracies. This site is a source of illustrations for one aspect of tech startups.